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Introduction
Reports on the political developments in Hungary in the 
German-language media (and, in part, in the internation-
al press as well) paint a contradictory picture. It appears 
from these reports that the country under the government 
of right-wing conservative Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
is increasingly distancing itself from Western democratic 
principles. At the same time, it is quite clear that these 
various news reports contain inconsistencies.
There is, for example, the frequent criticism that the 
Orbán government promotes an anti-Semitic climate 
in Hungary. At the same time, international media are 
noting increased interest in Hungary on the part of young 
Israelis who wish to live in Europe. Britain’s Economist, 
for example, reports that “Israelis with Ashkenazi, or East 
European, ancestry are queuing at German, Hungarian 
and Polish consulates for what was once regarded as a 
shameful act of seeking European passports.”1
Imre Kertész, Hungary’s Nobel Laureate in literature, 
recently described an encounter with a New York Times 
reporter that took place in July 2013. The reporter appar-
ently sought to direct the interview toward corroborating 
his own preexisting (negative) image of Hungary. The 
interview was never published, Kertész believes, because 
he did not confirm the journalist’s expectations. Kertész 
said that his interlocutor
thought I was going to speak out against Hungary, or 
Hungary today.... And I didn’t. He had come with the 
intention of getting me to say that Hungary is a dictator-
ship today, which it isn’t.… If you can write, speak openly, 
openly disagree, even leave the country, it is absurd to speak 
of dictatorship. And this is what I said. I am not pleased 
with everything happening in Hungary today, I do not think 
there was ever a time when I was pleased with everything 
happening here, but certainly Hungary is no dictatorship…. 
And the interview was never published. Which a friend of 
mine very accurately said is a kind of censorship: if someone 
gives an answer you don’t expect, then you don’t publish it.2
It could be argued that this sort of “censorship” exists 
in a larger context in outside reports on Hungary. Cer-
tainly, there is a palpable climate of disapproval. Covering 
anti-Orban protests last autumn, the Economist wrote, 
“The European Union has proved unwilling or unable to 
rein him [Orbán] in. Instead … the pressure is mostly 
coming from America. President Barack Obama recently 
bracketed Hungary with Egypt and Azerbaijan as coun-
tries in which civil society felt intimidated.”3 As reported 
in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, US Senator John 
McCain called Hungary “a nation that is on the verge of 
ceding its sovereignty to a neofascist dictator.”4 McCain’s 
remarks were made in connection with the appointment 
of a new US ambassador to Hungary. Should we therefore 
be surprised that Orbán believes the US tried to organize 
regime change in Hungary?
Another example: In the summer of 2014 Orbán gave a 
speech in the Romanian town Băile Tuşnad in which he 
criticized free market economies on social grounds. In 
connection with this argument, he pointed to the large 
state economic responsibility assumed by governments 
in countries such as Singapore, China, and Russia. Here 
much of the German and international press quoted him 
as referring to “illiberal democracies,” whereas Orbán 
had in fact chosen the formulation “illiberal states.” In 
doing so, the media made a connection to the political 
practices of these states that Orbán had not intended; his 
criticism of “liberal states” was clearly meant to apply 
only to the shortcomings of free-market economies.
These examples underline the importance of taking 
a closer look at Hungary today. The crisis in Ukraine – 
and the European Union’s strained relations with Rus-
sia – illustrate once again the tremendous importance of 
European consensus for the EU’s capacity to act. In this 
context, the degree of damaged to relations between Hun-
gary and the EU Commission is striking, and bilaterial re-
lations with a handful of EU member states are damaged 
as well. No EU member state has faced as much criticism 
of its domestic and foreign policy as Hungary.
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Germany and Hungary have traditionally enjoyed good 
relations. More than two decades ago, Hungary set a bold 
pace on the path that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
How does this fit with the image that is currently painted 
of Hungary’s government under Orbán? His adminis-
tration, since its electoral victory in the spring of 2010, 
has faced international criticism for using its two-thirds 
parliamentary majority to pass sweeping legislative and 
constitutional changes. Criticism in German-language 
media has hinged largely upon this political development. 
However, the EU Commission, the European Council, the 
European Parliament, and the governments of individual 
EU member states should first carefully review criticism 
of another member state on the basis of the facts. It 
should, moreover, be noted that the Hungarian govern-
ment delivered 51 percent of its 2014 EU Parliament votes 
to the conservative-centrist voting bloc – the European 
People’s Parties (EPP) – constituting the largest such 
electoral win in the entire EU. This runs counter to the 
tendency in the UK, for example, and other EU states to 
deliver increasing numbers of votes to euroskeptic parties.
A number of questions inspired the DGAP to call 
together a working group of German and Hungarian 
experts. What are the primary criticisms of Hungary for-
mulated by media within the EU and in the international 
press? Do these criticisms correspond with the facts? 
Where are the differences in views and attitudes between 
Hungary and other EU member states? Where are the 
misunderstandings, and how can these be reduced in or-
der to facilitate greater understanding between Hungary 
and the EU? What role can Germany play in this process?
The DGAP’s Working Group on Hungary consisted of 
Klaus von Dohnanyi, Ágnes Gelencsér, Dániel Hegedüs, 
and Gereon Schuch.5 As its first step, the group gradually 
collected the primary criticisms from largely German-
language media and organized these thematically. This 
was followed by a series of meetings to collect expert 
input; representatives of the Hungarian political research 
institutes Political Capital and Nézöpont were consulted, 
and some 15 legal scholars and political scientists, media 
experts, as well as specialists on minority rights from Ger-
many and Hungary shared their input. Finally a number 
of studies and reports on the Hungarian political situation 
were examined.
The Working Group felt it was essential to examine 
the developments within the context of national cul-
tural traditions. To what degree, it asked, could critical 
developments be explained by culturally or historically-
specific national peculiarities of democratic practice that 
could be accepted through the lens of the EU principles of 
national sovereignty and subsidiarity? Repeated criticism 
of the Hungarian government was therefore viewed in an 
international context and compared with the practices of 
other democratic states. The group sought to differentiate 
clearly between political decisions in Hungary that would 
have been made differently in Germany and those that 
must fundamentally be criticized on democratic grounds.
Hungary’s Historical Situation
Before the elections in 2010, Orbán announced his inten-
tion to undertake far-reaching reforms. (The attempts 
at comprehensive reform undertaken during his first 
government of 1998–2002 had largely failed.) Even if 
democratic conditions now prevailed, many structures 
had remained in post-communist ruts since 1989. Accord-
ing to Orbán’s party, Fidesz, and its campaign list partner, 
KDNP (the Christian Democratic People’s Party), numer-
ous positions in economics, society, and politics were still 
held – years after the fall of the Berlin Wall – by mem-
bers of the Communist Party or people who had come to 
power under socialism.6 (Despite Fidesz’s anti-communist 
approach, however, it must nonetheless be noted that 
numerous representatives of the socialist elites also found 
a new political home inside the party.) 
     According to most experts questioned by the Working 
Group, however, Hungary lacked cross-party consensus 
opportunities to undertake such necessary reforms in the 
period before 2010. In the 2010 elections, Orbán achieved 
not only a stable legislative majority but also the two-
thirds majority necessary for implementing constitutional 
changes – a result that opened up extensive room for 
maneuver.
In order to judge Orbán’s second electoral win and the 
policies subsequently enacted by his two-thirds majority, 
one must consider the astounding reform bottleneck that 
the previous socialist-liberal government (2002–10) had 
been unable to overcome. These circumstances made it 
especially difficult to deal with the economic crisis that 
began in 2008. Moreover, the Fidesz party from the first 
Orbán government (1998–2002) had experienced a strong 
leftist headwind in the media and at times, in its own 
view, a certain political pushback from the old guard.
In order to secure both their desired reforms and the 
necessary majorities for implementing them in the long 
term, Orbán’s government sought opportunities to secure 
a wide popular consensus. It did so in large part through 
renewed recognition of centuries-old markers of national-
ist Hungarian identity. Hungary’s singular linguistic and 
cultural development, with neither Slavic, nor Romance, 
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nor Germanic roots (Hungarian is not an Indo-European 
language), as well as its proud history of centuries of rule 
as an empire, had led to the focus on a uniquely Hungari-
an identity; the government seized this as an opportunity 
to reunite the deeply politically divided country across 
party lines.
This is how the Hungarian government has come to 
stand out for its unusually historically-oriented self im-
age in modern-day Europe. Hungarian cultural history 
can in a similar way be seen as a reason for the country’s 
regular rejection of political demands (and political 
criticism) from other countries both inside and outside 
of Europe. Prime Minister Orbán, in his words, “arms” 
himself in “defense” of his country against “interference 
in Hungarian affairs” by the European Commission and 
other countries. He feels he has been misunderstood and 
regularly identifies as irresponsible his critics’ ignorance 
of his country’s exceptional circumstances.
In order to better understand what appears to be an 
overreaction, it is important to give greater attention to 
the historical and political background of a certain Hun-
garian truism: that throughout history Hungary repeat-
edly had to reclaim its freedom from foreign powers. The 
Ottoman yoke, Austrian rule, and the successive German 
and Soviet occupations have not been forgotten. Hun-
gary’s history was by necessity one of self-determination. 
Perhaps that is the reason why in 1956, three years after 
the uprising in East Germany, the Hungarians led the only 
military-backed freedom revolt against the Soviet powers. 
None of the later uprisings against the Soviets in Central 
Europe were marked by such consistency. In the context 
of this historical self image, Orbán as a student leader in 
the summer of 1989 bravely called for the removal of all 
Soviet troops from Hungary.
Today, at a time when culturally and historically 
shaped identities are growing in significance (Northern 
Ireland, Scotland, Catalonia, northern Italy, Corsica, and 
others come to mind), we must take into account the 
growth of collective national memory in Hungary. Yet 
the country’s nationalist emphasis on the past is often 
misunderstood. Many of the Orbán government’s actions 
and statements are more easily grasped, however, when 
this context is considered.
Individual Areas of International Criticism
This report accompanies a series of main topics with 
excerpts from recent media reports, followed by exami-
nation of common media criticism. The group examined 
media reports relating to the rule of law in Hungary, the 
separation of powers, judiciary independence, electoral 
laws, the state of the Hungarian media, matters of social 
justice and corruption, anti-Semitism, homelessness, 
and the conditions experienced by the Roma minority. 
German-language newspapers and media were given 
precedence for practical reasons, although examples are 
also easily found across international outlets.
Rule of Law
An example from media coverage:
Hungary’s new constitution undermines the rule of law. 
It removes the Constitutional Court’s checks on taxation 
and budgetary legislation. In this way, it creates the oppor-
tunity for constitutionally inviable law to take effect without 
allowing for any form of recourse, thereby shaking the court’s 
authority.
The rule of law is being further eroded by the new consti-
tution’s lengthy, inconsistent, and ideologically one-sided 
preamble, which calls itself a “National Avowal.” This credo 
is not a meaningless verse of the constitution but rather has 
been explicitly identified as a mandatory measure of consti-
tutional interpretation.... 
This threatens substantial damage to the very principle 
of democracy. The constitution limits every future govern-
ment’s room to maneuver. In the future many laws, even cen-
tral taxation and social security reforms, will only be able to 
be changed by a two-thirds majority. But for a government 
to hold a two-thirds parliamentary majority of the sort that 
Prime Minister Orbán’s Fidesz party currently enjoys is the 
exception rather than the rule.
The drafting process deeply harmed the constitution’s 
legitimacy. The opposition refused to cooperate. There were 
no nationwide meetings to advise on proposals. Even a 
referendum was avoided. These failures are visible even in 
the content of the constitution. This document does not seek 
to make possible the coexistence of various political interests 
and preferences. Instead it is an attempt to unilaterally re-
structure Hungary to suit the preferences of Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán and the political powers that support him. No 
one, apart from Orbán and his people, supported this reor-
ganization. Despite the fact that a new constitution played 
no role in Orbán’s reelection campaign, this is how he chose 
to complete the “revolution at the polls,” as he called it at in 
his electoral victory speech.7 
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Critical reflection 
Restriction of the Constitutional Court’s  
judicial authority
The article claims that the new Hungarian constitu- 
tion (the Fundamental Law) undermines the rule of law 
because the Constitutional Court is no longer allowed 
oversight over taxation and budgetary legislation. In 
reality, the constitution contains the following regulation 
(Article 37, Paragraph 4): 
As long as state debt exceeds half of the gross domestic 
product, the Constitutional Court may, within its powers set 
out in Article 24 (2) b) to e), review the Acts on the central 
budget, the implementation of the central budget, central 
taxes, duties and contributions, customs duties, and the 
central conditions for local taxes for conformity with the 
Fundamental Law exclusively in connection with the rights 
to life and human dignity, to the protection of personal data, 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, or the rights 
related to Hungarian citizenship, and it may annul these 
Acts only for the violation of these rights.8
This regulation does in fact “create the opportunity 
for constitutionally inviable law to take effect ... thereby 
shaking the court’s authority,” as the cited article states. 
On the other hand, this regulation could strengthen the 
primacy of the parliament in budgetary policy, which in 
general democratic understanding is indeed a fundamen-
tal parliamentary right.
The anchoring of a debt brake in the new constitution 
is fundamentally welcomed, even by the experts we ques-
tioned. While the first Orbán government (1998–2002) 
was able to lower the debt from 60.4 percent to 52 percent 
of GDP, the socialist-liberal government (2002–10) let 
state debt balloon again to 82 percent (in 2008, even 
before the economic crisis). Only emergency credit 
amounting to nearly €12.5 billion from the International 
Monetary Fund and the EU was able to save Hungary 
from default.
Naturally, it cannot be denied that the constitution’s 
Article 37, Paragraph 4 means a partial prohibition of 
norm control on taxation and finance laws. This has been 
attacked by a majority of Hungarian legal experts as 
contrary to the rule of law. This opinion was influenced 
heavily by the unique background of this specific regula-
tion: the Constitutional Court would have found one new 
special taxation regulation – a 98-percent tax applied only 
to the severance packages of state employees – unconsti-
tutional under the rules of the old constitution. It was for 
this reason that the parliamentary majority restricted the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction to this degree with the 
new regulation under Article 37, Paragraph 4. 
Some experts we consulted hinted that the admin-
istration’s attempt to implement the special 98-percent 
tax correctly recognized a political problem, yet failed 
to solve it in its indifferent (and therefore in many cases 
unjust) application.
Even today, the Hungarian Constitutional Court can 
apply its regulatory jurisdiction to budgetary and finance 
matters while pointing out damage to fundamental civil 
rights specified in Article 37, Paragraph 4. There are 
already examples of precisely such cases. The statement 
that the new constitution fundamentally undermines the 
rule of law therefore appears incorrect.
The preamble to the constitution
Critics see another violation of the rule of law in the ideo-
logical one-sidedness of the preamble, which has been 
declared the constitutional measure of interpretation. 
The preamble is an avowal of values. As such it elevates 
specific values – those deemed especially important by 
the parliamentary constitutional majority – while never-
theless explicitly recognizing all other “minority values 
and rights.”9 This is a point of contention among experts; 
according to some constitutional experts, the preamble’s 
content does not contradict the rule of law. 
Certainly, it would have been politically more savvy to 
develop wider consensus on such a far-reaching pream-
ble – for the stress on certain, specifi c values cannot pos-
sibly reflect a pluralistic society completely and thereby 
offers an unnecessary opportunity for further division 
within Hungarian society. There does not seem to be a 
persuasive argument, however, that the rule of law is 
fundamentally under threat.
Cardinal Acts
The article cited above also considers the so-called Cardi-
nal Acts to be a threat to democracy. These cardinal acts 
(that is, laws that can only be changed with a two-thirds 
parliamentary majority but nevertheless lack constitu-
tional status) were not introduced by the Orbán govern-
ment in order to reduce the room for maneuver of future 
governments. Rather they have existed in large part since 
the democratic upheaval of 1989. Cardinal acts were the 
result of distrust between the then-democratic opposition 
and the ruling state party and were intended to prevent 
the communist powers-that-be from gaining strength, 
as well as to ensure the stability of the democratization 
process. At that time, they were considered an essential 
element fortifying the principle of democracy. Since 
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then, people have always complained that that they could 
prevent current Hungarian policy changes; however, a 
majority has yet to form that could abolish them – a step 
that some experts would find desirable, as it could open 
up further opportunities for greater democratization. The 
question remains if this practice – one in which even 
taxation policy is drawn into these cardinal acts – is sim-
ply unfairly restrictive to future governments. 
Other experts argue, however, that cardinal acts play 
a stabilizing role and continue to consider them essential, 
especially considering the economic crisis and upheaval 
situation currently facing Hungary. According to this 
view, matters “of continuing public interest” – those 
which are dependent upon a unified constitutional 
framework – should be regulated by such cardinal acts 
in order to outlast administration changes, providing 
stability from election to election. For example, cardinal 
acts include the regulation of party financing; protection 
of national minorities; the creation of regulatory authori-
ties; the regulation of jurisdiction; the division of powers 
between central and local governments; and the taxation 
status of religious entities.10 
It remains, therefore, a question of perspective 
whether the cardinal acts damage basic democratic prin-
ciples or whether they serve to strengthen the country’s 
democratic stability. In the end, cardinal acts restrict the 
room for maneuver of every government equally – includ-
ing a Fidesz government that at the moment only rules by 
simple majority.
Lack of legitimacy:  
unilateral restructuring of the country?
Finally, the article claims that the new constitution lacks 
legitimacy due to its failure to include the opposition 
in the drafting process. The Orbán administration is 
accused of reforming Hungary unilaterally to suit the 
interests and preferences of the prime minister. The 
constitution, it says, was agreed to by “no one apart from 
Orbán and his people.” 
If one expects the legitimacy of constitution drafting to 
be measured in referendum votes, then perhaps one could 
conclude that legitimacy was in this case tarnished. The 
Socialists boycotted the parliamentary debate to which 
the draft constitution was subjected, arguing that only a 
very short amount of time had been granted for review. 
(This is true – it was just one month.) Furthermore, the 
opposition wanted to prevent its own pseudo-participa-
tion and made repeatedly clear this was another reason it 
refused to seek consensus. In return, Fidesz accused the 
Socialists of avoiding the debate not because of its content 
but, rather, in order to reap immediate political gains. 
The extreme right-wing Jobbik party rejected the propos-
als outright.11
In this way, all political powers – not just “Orbán and 
his people” – were responsible for the new constitution’s 
purported lack of legitimacy. The only proposed changes 
were submitted by an independent member of parliament, 
Katalin Szili (formerly MSZP12), as well as two alternative 
proposals submitted by constitutional lawyers, some of 
whose recommendations – on unimportant matters, they 
would argue – were in fact included. 
If there was an absence of debate, it was at least partly 
the fault of the opposition. No referendum was held (as 
was the case, it should be noted, in Germany in both 1949 
and 1990); instead the government initiated a “national 
consultation” in the form of a survey. This was criticized 
– fairly – by the opposition, as the phrasing of the ques-
tions unfairly influenced the answers. Of eight million 
surveys distributed by the government, only 917,000 were 
returned.
The legitimacy of the process of drafting the constitu-
tion was above all justified by the Orbán government’s 
two-thirds majority. In this case, because they gave him a 
parliamentary constitutional majority, the voters them-
selves belong to the category of “Orbán and his people.” 
The government rejected several times the opposition’s 
charge that “a new constitution played no role in Orbán’s 
2010 electoral strategy.”13 The previous constitution from 
the socialist period had always acknowledged that it was 
provisional, even in its own text, and formally carried 
the title “Law XX: 1949.” Constitutional reform had been 
on the docket of every Hungarian government since the 
democratic reforms of 1990. Every administration had 
had its commissioner for constitutional reform, but previ-
ously either the necessary two-thirds majority was lack-
ing or the government (like the socialist-liberal coalition 
of 1994–98) had been unable, despite its constitutional 
majority, to reach consensus on a new constitution within 
its coalition.
The large majority of the constitutional experts we 
consulted generally agreed that the old constitution 
as emended in 1990 did its job despite its patchwork of 
changes but that the new 2011 constitution is far more 
structurally coherent. Finally, it is uncontested that a 
clear and formal break with the communist past could 
only be achieved through such a symbolic final stroke: 
drafting a new constitution.
The claim that a “unilateral restructuring” of the 
country occurred is correct to the degree that the new 
constitution was voted in exclusively by members of one 
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political party on one side of the political spectrum. It 
must be recalled,  however, that this party held the neces-
sary two-thirds parliamentary majority, thereby legiti-
mizing the constitutional changes.
Through its formulation that the new constitution was 
an attempt “to unilaterally restructure Hungary to suit 
the preferences of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the 
political powers that support him,” the article reflects the 
common criticism in the German media that Hungary is 
ruled by a “controlled democracy.” Although expressing 
some reservations, every one of the experts we consulted 
refuted this criticism. In the Hungarian political system 
– similar to Germany’s chancellor-led democracy – the ex-
ecutive branch and, above all, the head of the government 
are powerful. Such division of power began to develop in 
the mid-1990s and has continued to consolidate ever since. 
The institutional structure of the 2011 constitution 
further strengthens the administration and above all its 
head. Nevertheless, experts on all sides agreed that this 
is still within the boundaries of the rule of law. As head of 
state, Orbán is assuredly stronger than the constitution 
explicitly states; he neither faces competitors within his 
own ranks nor does the opposition present a plausible 
challenger. Further, he is an extremely self-confident and 
power-oriented personality and clearly dominates politi-
cal developments in Hungary.
The charge that the Orbán administration undermined 
the rule of law and damaged democracy must neverthe-
less be examined more critically. It must also be differen-
tiated from the reality of the two-thirds parliamentary 
majority. Even if certain legislative changes today leave 
loopholes for potentially unconstitutional lawmaking 
in the future – for example, because the Constitutional 
Court can only review current budgetary measures under 
the criteria given Article 37, Paragraph 4, or because 
the system of cardinal acts could create gridlock – this 
alone represents neither a subversion of democracy nor a 
restructuring of the country at the prime minister’s whim. 
If one nevertheless still holds that the state has been 
“unilaterally restructured,” one must add that this was 
achieved by means of a legitimate parliamentary majority 
– a majority that voters confirmed a second time and third 
time in 2014 in both national and EU elections, giving 
them the highest majority of any EU country. That said, 
changes to the constitution must also be measured by the 
democratic quality of their results.
For this reason it is recommended that Fidesz use its 
powerful majority in such a way that the parliamentary 
minority can be included in important decision-making 
processes. For this to work, one must assume tolerance 
and willingness on the part of both sides.
Separation of Powers
An example from media coverage:
On the other hand, Orbán is using the two-thirds  
majority – as many other politicians across the former 
communist states of Eastern Europe would in his posi-
tion – to shamelessly cement the power of his own party. 
Orbán, however, went one step further. The fourth series of 
constitutional amendments passed Monday were Fidesz’s 
direct response to earlier Constitutional Court rulings that 
had, to Orbán’s dismay, declared an entire set of tempo-
rary regulations unconstitutional. Now some of these have 
been enshrined in the heart of the constitution, albeit with 
modifications intended to circumvent the court’s decision. 
Such an annulment of the Constitutional Court is a viola-
tion of the principles of the rule of law and a blow to the 
division of powers. The Constitutional Court has previously 
rejected various legislative projects. It appears that Orbán 
cannot bear political defeat. This is the only way to explain 
the recent restrictions to the authority of the Constitutional 
Court, which administration representatives have called a 
widening of its scope. The highest judges are now allowed 
to examine constitutional provisions based solely on the 
validity of their formal conclusion, thereby relieving them of 
control over the content.14
Critical reflection 
That a party would use its two-thirds majority to 
strengthen its own position is not unusual in a democrat-
ic state. The question, then, is how far does it go? Where 
does the Fidesz majority recognize its limits? Would the 
constitutional order as it stands today still be capable of 
restricting the Orbán government if necessary?
The central criticism targets the use of so-called 
constitutional slight of hand: the parliamentary major-
ity canceled out the Constitutional Court’s ruling that 
certain regulations were unconstitutional by changing 
the fundamental law itself to include these regulations, 
thereby removing its constitutional control in this case.
That a parliamentary majority can limit the control 
functions of a constitutional court is common interna-
tional practice. In exactly this way, for example, Ger-
many added a debt brake to the constitution that also 
binds the Federal Constitutional Court, albeit without 
the limitations now enshrined in Article 37, Paragraph 4 
of the Hungarian constitution. That the Constitutional 
Court cannot decide on content matters, but rather 
performs a perfunctory formal control of constitutional 
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provisions and changes, had previously also been the 
case in Hungary and has now been recodified into the 
constitution. The media, or more specifically the cited 
article, incorrectly identified this as a new removal of 
competencies. Remember that Germany’s federal interior 
minister, constitutional experts, and political parties are 
presently discussing whether the country should not add 
the five percent voter threshold directly to the German 
constitution following the Federal Constitutional Court’s 
ruling that any threshold for EU elections is prohibited, 
largely in order to avoid a similar judicial ban affecting 
German Bundestag elections. 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court, it must be 
noted, was not “rendered powerless,” but rather certain 
competencies were altered; in specific cases it received 
less power, in other cases it was granted more. This led, 
for example, to the abolition of general public interest 
lawsuits (actio popularis) and the expansion of constitu-
tional court jurisdiction over court decisions, following 
the German model – a change that had been pushed by 
legal experts for over twenty years and even welcomed 
by the Venice Commission.15 Under the previous legal 
structure, the mechanism of public interest lawsuits 
granted every citizen the right to bring any law before 
the Constitutional Court in order to examine its consti-
tutionality – an effective means of discarding the ballast 
of unconstitutional laws as quickly as possible during the 
post-communist transition. More recently, however, pub-
lic interest lawsuits had become an enormous burden on 
the Constitutional Court. For this reason, legal experts 
we consulted supported the abolition of public interest 
lawsuits, underlining that it is more than enough for an 
actual victim to have the right to pursue action against 
an act of administrative abuse of power.
How the new fundamental law has shaped parliamen-
tary control since its adoption is difficult to judge, given 
that Fidesz once again achieved a two-thirds majority: 
there is no oppositional party strong enough to practice 
any form of meaningful parliamentary control.
That judicial checks still exist today is undisputed. 
The principle of division of powers could be compro-
mised, however, to the degree that Fidesz with its two-
thirds majority selected Constitutional Court judges who, 
while qualified, were nevertheless close to the ruling 
party. Even the head of the justice department is a lawyer 
who is also close to the administration, which further 
suggests limited independence. In other words, the 
practice of checks and balances could be affected by the 
personnel policies of the government. This suggests that 
a correction of governmental practice is in fact necessary 
here. The allocation of such central positions in a state 
governed by the rule of law must always be transparent 
and accessible to the opposition. 
Judiciary Independence
An example from media coverage:
Given concerns about the state of Hungarian democracy, 
the EU initiated proceedings for three separate contract 
violations against Viktor Orbán’s administration.…
The first proceeding is against a law lowering the retire-
ment age of judges from 70 to 62. Budapest is formally 
being charged with age discrimination. Even the regular 
retirement age in Hungary is higher. In reality, however, the 
Commission is implying that Orbán hereby seeks to dismiss 
disagreeable judges and replace them with his followers. 
The mandatory early retirement law would affect 274 judges 
this year alone....
In addition to the initiation of these three proceedings, 
the Commission is demanding from the Orbán government 
further disclosures about its judicial reform efforts. The 
Commission fears that the overall independence of the judi-
ciary no longer meets European standards.16
Critical reflection 
The controversial legal provision intended to decrease the 
retirement age for judges (then 70) to Hungary’s then-
general retirement age of 62. It was known at the time, 
however, that the general retirement age would soon be 
raised to 65. This so-called Judges’ Law called for the 
removal of all judges over age 62, even if this resulted in a 
reduction of their expected retirement benefits. The same 
was to hold for notaries and state attorneys. The change 
affected hundreds of positions. Given the means by which 
pensions are calculated, many affected individuals in 
many cases faced enormous pension losses.
The European Commission threatened to pursue treaty 
violation proceedings. Brussels claimed that the law was 
a form of age discrimination. After the law had been re-
moved, it was replaced with new regulations reducing the 
retirement age from 70 to 65 in phases for everyone born 
after 1945 while at the same time providing for necessary 
adjustments to the social security system. To compare 
with other European countries. Even the German con-
stitution (Article 97, Paragraph 2) allows judges to be 
placed under early retirement. A similar Judges’ Law was 
used to take advantage of this possibility. In Italy, Prime 
Minister Matteo Renzi recently reduced the retirement 
age of judges from 75 to 70; a further reduction to age 66 
is planned to occur by 2016. This measure was greeted 
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positively by the EU as a needed social security reform 
that simultaneously opened up employment positions for 
younger judges. Some Hungarian journalists used this to 
illustrate their complaint that the EU measures Italy and 
Hungary on two different scales.17
Nevertheless, the legal reduction of the retirement age 
of judges from 70 to 62 was clearly a politically motivated 
measure by the Fidesz administration. The early retire-
ment of judges was intended to make possible a transfor-
mation of the elite even across the judiciary. The adminis-
tration most likely bore distrust toward the older gen-
eration of legal experts, because some judges still serve 
who were on the bench before 1989. Even the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court had been stocked with judges who 
had served before the revolution; in 2012, however, none 
of these were still in office.
In comparison, Germany has only very few judges still 
in service from the former German Democratic Repub-
lic.18 Not a single one of them ever sat on the reunified 
Germany’s Constitutional Court. It is important to note 
here that the situation in the former East Germany was 
unique; it was possible to replace the old elite with West 
Germans. Such a situation did not exist in other post-
communist states, which ultimately led to the problems 
criticized by the Orbán administration. Unfortunately, 
in its attempt to force early retirement, the government 
trampled the principle of judicial independence.
Similar to the law on early judicial retirement, the law 
regarding case relocation from one court to another was 
criticized as antithetical to the basic principles of the rule 
of law and was reversed in response to EU pressure, de-
spite the fact that the Fidesz government viewed each of 
these attempts to reform both the state and the judiciary 
as consistent with EU law. For this reason, the administra-
tion at first refused to reverse these laws. The possibility 
for case relocation was officially intended to more evenly 
distribute cases across all courts, as records show that the 
Budapest courts were especially overburdened.19 Every 
expert we consulted agreed that the courts are indeed 
overwhelmed. Given these conditions, the principle of the 
rule of law was in fact being threatened, but instead by 
the fact that many cases passed their statute of limita-
tions before they could be adjudicated. In many cases, 
even clearly guilty verdicts could not be passed down. 
Hungary was also criticized by the EU for the burden 
caused by the length of its legal process. As a result, the 
general public viewed the justice system quite negatively 
before the new legal measures were put in place.
Nevertheless, the EU’s criticism here is fair: If it is 
possible to move cases between courts, it would also be 
possible to seek out a court friendlier to the administra-
tion in certain instances. The critics also rightly point 
out that moving court cases to other cities could result in 
additional burdens on the legal parties which in the end 
could limit their right to a fair and independent trial.
While it would be wrong to accuse Orbán’s administra-
tion of threatening the rule of law in Hungary today, it is 
nonetheless true that certain government attempts – in-
tended to free the state from what it viewed as structures 
and persons inherited from the immediate post-commu-
nist era – in fact could have contradicted the rule of law 
in their details. These were rightly criticized and forced 
to be corrected. To conclude from this, however, that 
antidemocratic tendencies are being harbored in threats 
to the division of powers simply does not hold up under 
expert scrutiny.
Electoral Laws
An example from media coverage:
According to some opinion pollsters, the fact that Orbán 
can again count on a two-thirds constitutional majority is 
in part due to the deeply altered electoral laws that many 
critics see as unfairly benefitting his party in many ways.…
Above all, Fidesz is accused of arbitrarily dividing voting 
districts to the exclusive benefit of Fidesz, because tradi-
tional leftist strongholds were broken up and conservative 
districts were either added to or greatly enlarged. This so-
called gerrymandering is a popular practice among ruling 
parties, but the magnitude here appears excessive. Political 
Capital, a Hungarian think tank critical of the government, 
reckoned that the leftist opposition coalition needs 300,000 
more votes than Fidesz in order to achieve a parliamentary 
majority. This is almost four percent of registered voters. 
The new lines, moreover, were passed as a Cardinal Act and 
therefore can only be altered with a two-thirds majority – 
which was the same as the old electoral laws.20
Critical reflection 
The charge this article cites – that Fidesz adjusted the new 
electoral laws to fit the party’s needs – was also regularly 
noted in postelection analyses that characterized the 2014 
parliamentary elections as “free, but not fair.” 
     This was the same conclusion reached by both Political 
Capital and the Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE). Elections under the new laws are 
“free” because the same rules apply to every party. How-
ever, the new laws include certain elements benefiting 
the current ruling party, and for this reason the elections 
are not “fair.”
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Problematic elements of the new electoral laws include 
the new voting district maps, electoral advertising regula-
tions, and so-called winner compensation.
The new voting districts map: gerrymandering
New electoral laws were necessary for various reasons. 
First, the number of parliamentary seats had been 
reduced from 386 to 199, which was a sensible and 
universally approved measure.21 Second, the existing 
voting district divisions were unconstitutional and did 
not meet the recommendations of the Venice Commis-
sion, because the differences in the number of residents 
of various districts were simply too large (in some cases 
up to threefold). 
The Constitutional Court addressed this unconstitu-
tionality in a 2005 ruling, ordering parliament to use its 
two-thirds majority to address the differences between 
voting districts. This did not occur immediately, some ex-
perts believe, because constitutional changes to electoral 
law in the run-up to the 2006 parliamentary elections 
were not in the interest of the socialist-liberal govern-
ment of the time. Nor was it achieved during their second 
term in 2007, following a second call to action from the 
Constitutional Court. It unclear whether the opposition 
of 2005 or 2007 (Fidesz at the time) would have con-
structively supported such changes, which necessitated a 
two-thirds majority.
A new voting districts map, therefore, has been obliga-
tory since 2005. It has also been recognized by all sides 
that the new electoral map divides the population far 
more equally than the old district boundaries, even if 
certain gerrymandering effects are visible.
Gerrymandering is common in many democracies. 
The US and some European countries are prime exam-
ples. The practice alone does not signal a major demo-
cratic deficit. It is, however, problematic that the Fidesz- 
KDNP government neither allowed the cooperation of 
the opposition when drawing the voting district bound-
aries, nor offered them any opportunity to influence the 
process. This remains troublesome even when one con-
siders the fact that the old voting districts map was also 
drawn up (by the last communist government) without 
any consensus (and at the time greatly, and exclusively, 
benefited the left).
Even if there is a tendency, as in many democratic 
states, to draw electoral boundaries to create simple 
majorities, critics of the new laws agree that Orbán’s 2014 
victory cannot be attributed to the new electoral district 
lines alone. Orbán would have won the election even ac-
cording to the old electoral map. He would not, however, 
have reached the two-thirds majority a second time, and 
thereby would have lost the necessary parliamentary 
constitutional majority. 
Electoral laws in democracies are rarely perfect: One 
need only think of Britain’s “first-past-the-post” system 
or the US electoral college that in 2000 granted George 
W. Bush electoral victory despite the fact that he lost the 
popular vote. Characterizing the Hungarian electoral 
system as undemocratic simply does not stand up in 
international comparison.
Campaign advertisements:  
television and posters
In Hungary’s public media, the time allotted to electoral 
advertising is distributed fairly among parties. Critics 
object that while campaign advertising is limited in public 
broadcasting, there are no such limitations on govern-
ment “information campaigns.” Private broadcasters must 
grant all parties equal amounts of electoral advertising 
time but are not allowed to charge for broadcasting. Giv-
en this regulation, private broadcasters are not financially 
interested in granting time for advertising, despite the 
fact that a majority of people could be reached through 
this medium. For this reason, campaigning is heaviest on 
the streets and in newspapers – two areas where Fidesz 
has a market share advantage. (Until February 2015, 
most of the billboard and advertising space belonged to 
businessman Lajos Simicska, a close friend and supporter 
of Orbán.)
The regulation on electoral signage applies to parties 
but not to government information or NGOs. On the one 
hand, this leads to a situation in which parties cannot 
advertise in certain spaces, whereas the government can 
use the space for information – even if this information 
is identical to its electoral advertising. On the other hand, 
this regulation grants distinct advantage to better-funded 
parties; they can transfer part of their campaigning to 
their closest NGO partners, thereby indirectly spending 
more than the expenditure limit (995 million Forint – 
about 3.3 million euros) on campaign financing; there is 
no spending cap on electoral advertising for civil society 
organizations. Such “cooperation” is purported to be the 
case with the Forum for Civil Solidarity (in Hungarian, 
CÖF), which sponsored massive rallies and events on 
behalf of Fidesz. 
The Fidesz administration has turned these accusa-
tions around on civil society organizations that support 
the opposition, arguing that they actively campaign 
against the administration with the financial support of 
the Norway Grants.22 In his Băile Tuşnad speech of sum-
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mer 2014, Orbán protested that “foreign interest group” 
payments such as the Norway Grants served to influence 
politics in Hungary instead of improving general social 
welfare as intended, making it necessary for the state 
to intervene. It is true that early warnings from inde-
pendent auditors such as Ernst & Young had noted some 
irregularities in their earliest reports on the Ökotárs and 
Demnet foundations (two of the organizations managing 
the Hungarian Norway grants). There was some concern 
that the funding applications were vetted not by indepen-
dent consultants but by employees close to the Ökotárs 
Foundation, and that specific groups were regularly and 
generously supported while others always went away 
empty-handed. However, the government’s heavy-handed 
reaction did not fit the circumstances: full searches with 
police supervision, followed by seizure of documents 
from both the Ökotárs and Demnet foundations. Both 
raids can be rightly criticized as an attempt to silence or 
intimidate these organizations, or even as a crude show 
of power, since both foundations were entirely coopera-
tive in early government audits. Given the government’s 
behavior toward the Ökotárs and Demnet foundations, 
the concern voiced by both the Hungarian opposition and 
international observers is legitimate.
Compensation of winners
Is the new electoral measures granting so-called winner 
compensation worth criticizing? Internationally, loser 
compensation is more typical in mixed electoral systems; 
that means that ineffective votes cast for second- or third-
place candidates are collected on a compensation list, 
which can lead to an additional seat. Similarly, according 
to the new Hungarian electoral law, the extra votes – that 
is, those that made up the difference between first and 
second place in any given district and were therefore un-
necessary for the win – will also be collected on a com-
pensation list and can lead to additional seats. However 
the Hungarian method disproportionally benefits the 
strongest party. 
Even such a regulation can make sense when ap-
plied to the creation of a governing majority. Italy, for 
example, uses a similar method in elections where no 
party receives a majority, awarding the plurality-winning 
coalition 55 percent of the available seats – the threshold 
for an absolute majority. The potential results of such a 
bonus, however, are far less drastic in Italy than there are 
in Hungary.
When the new Hungarian electoral laws were final-
ized, the goal of winner compensation was primarily the 
same as in the Italian version: stabilization of the ability 
to govern in a parliamentary system. That Fidesz in 2014 
would then achieve a two-thirds parliamentary consti-
tutional majority under the new rules (by a slim margin 
of just one seat) given its popularity could not have been 
predicted. From this perspective, the Hungarian regula-
tion is possibly a stabilizing factor – albeit in the eyes of 
some experts an excessive one – that cannot be criticized 
fundamentally as undemocratic.
To sum up, all experts we consulted agreed that the 
new electoral district map and the electoral advertising 
regulations may contain elements that benefit the current 
government, but that these were not the decisive factors 
in the 2014 elections, given the Fidesz party’s very high 
popularity. The claim that the new laws made Orbán’s 
electoral success possible can be considered correct only 
to the degree that they led not just to a majority govern-
ment but perhaps also contributed to the narrow reconsti-
tution of a two-thirds parliamentary majority.
Some of our experts felt that a more plausible and 
more powerful opposition could have won the 2014 elec-
tions despite their media disadvantage, much as Fidesz 
had won in 1998 despite leftist-liberal media blowback. 
This theory could be supported by 2015’s by-election of an 
independent candidate. Criticism with regard to the per-
sonal and structural means available to the government 
to practice illicit electoral advertising is justified.
The State of Hungarian Media
An example from a German news program:
The year [2011] is beginning poorly for Europe. It is not 
just about the euro; it is about freedom. We now have a 
president of the Council of the EU [Orbán] who has brought 
his country’s media under his control. Since the new year 
started, freedom and diversity of the press have become 
baseless. This affects not only ten million Hungarians; it af-
fects all Europeans. And it is a disgrace for the 26 remaining 
heads of state and government. It is bad enough that Berlus-
coni and Sarkozy find it completely normal that party loyal-
ists fill the ranks of [Italian and French] media. But the fact 
that the new president of the Council of the EU with little 
ado undoes one of Europe’s greatest accomplishments has a 
different quality entirely. If the German chancellor criticizes 
the rulers in Beijing or Moscow for harassing journalists or 
silencing the Internet, they will now be able to point a finger 
back at Budapest. This is how Europe loses; this is how we 
lose our credibility. Naturally we must criticize [Alexander] 
Lukashenko and Belarus or attack Teheran’s mullahs over 
the arrest of German journalists. But our most important 
infraction is in Hungary. In the center of Europe, a basic 
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right is under attack. Orbán’s media law is no trivial of-
fense. Democracy and market economics no longer go hand 
in hand. Freedom for the market but not [from] uncomfort-
able thoughts. Growth through capitalism and consumption, 
but without criticism. This is a dangerous virus spreading 
throughout the world. If Europe cannot maintain immunity 
against this virus, we are turning our backs on ourselves 
and our best values. As long as Orbán’s media law is enacted, 
Budapest cannot be allowed to bask in the glow of leading 
Europe [as Council president]. Diplomatic cordialities like 
those seen at [Orbán’s] first visit as EU leader are cowardly. 
It would be a disgrace for Angela Merkel and her colleagues 
to smile in the summit’s traditional family photo while 
standing next to a censor. Freedom in Europe – not just the 
euro – is now desperately in need of rescue.23 
Critical reflection 
Freedom and diversity of the press
The commentary cited above was provoked by the pas-
sage of the new Hungarian media law in autumn 2010. Is 
the government practicing control – or even censorship?
All of the experts we consulted agreed unanimously 
that both freedom and diversity of the press are present 
in Hungary and that neither control nor censorship are 
practiced. The experts further verified that Hungary is 
home to a pluralistic, if at times highly polarized media 
landscape. A large part of Hungarian media is politically 
biased, while another part is independent. It was stressed 
that in Hungary the political preferences of a media 
outlet’s owner do not always compromise that outlet’s 
content. Further, all major German-language media com-
panies are also active in the Hungarian media market: the 
Funke group, Axel Springer, Ringier, and Bertelsmann. 
Short overview of the media landscape
The political daily newspapers are divided proportion-
ally: two large papers are left-leaning (Népszabadság, 
which favors the MSZP and remains the largest national 
daily newspaper, as well as Népszava), and two are right-
leaning (Magyar Nemzet and Magyar Hírlap). Among 
the private television broadcasters, two are right-leaning 
(hírtv and EchoTv) and one is left-leaning (atv). Private 
broadcasters and websites, many of which are openly 
critical of the government, are counted as politically 
independent media.
Media law and the Media Council
Hungary is dealing with questions similar to those facing 
other post-socialist countries. How can a pluralistic media 
landscape develop out of the former monopoly held by 
communist press and media? The old media law, passed 
in the wake of political revolution, had what some of our 
experts called a “facade of consensus”; the Media Council 
was made up of party representatives as well as repre-
sentatives from apparently independent NGOs. Many of 
the latter were often in fact socialists and leftist liberals. 
Naturally most of the experienced media professionals of 
the time – and as a result, the most significant personali-
ties in broadcasting – had also been active under the old 
regime. 
The Fidesz administration sought to use its 2010 elec-
toral victory to break with the past in this field and create 
new and more balanced conditions. With the new media 
law, the parliament created a new national media and 
communications agency responsible for the distribution 
of licenses and the registration of media entities. Its most 
significant body is the Media Council, which monitors the 
media law’s normative regulations and which can apply 
sanctions as necessary. It is independent in accordance 
with statutory regulations. The five new members of the 
Media Council are selected by parliament. In 2011, the 
two-thirds majority formed by Fidesz-KDNP voted in only 
individuals who had a close connection to Fidesz, individ-
uals whose independence had to be proven. Their term in 
office is nine years, which is unusually long by European 
standards. This supports the claim that Fidesz sought to 
secure its people in this position through as many legisla-
tive periods as possible.
On the other hand, the problems with the media 
sector seem to illustrate a problem with political party 
personnel (using the two-thirds majority) rather than an 
institutional problem. It would surely have been smarter 
and more democratic to fill one or two seats with op-
position candidates, whereby the majority relationship 
in parliament would also have been more accurately 
reflected.24 A political party orientation in Hungarian 
media institutions also existed previously; the socialist-
liberal governments, however, created a better facade of 
civil control in the Media Council. Despite this inequality, 
there has yet to be any known systematic micromanage-
ment of oppositional media on the part of the Media 
Council. Punishment has been doled out instead to media 
outlets close to the government (the right-wing journalist 
and Fidesz cofounder Zsolt Bayer was fined). Fines were 
also levied against Jobbik media outlets for racist state-
ments. Criticism was justified when the oppositional radio 
station Klubrádió was denied a license extension on the 
grounds of a (purely formal) error on its license applica-
tion.  Klubrádió ultimately won its subsequent lawsuit.
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Centralization of news production via MTI
The new national media and communications agency is 
often accused of centralizing news production, because 
the Hungarian news agency (MTI) offers its services to 
editorial staffs free of charge. This opportunity, intended 
as a means of providing financial support to all forms 
of media, has led most editorial staffs – especially local 
newspapers in rural areas – to print almost exclusively 
MTI news reports. The homogeneity of news this system 
creates throughout the entire media landscape could 
indeed threaten the balance of news reporting; while all 
editorial staffs have the right to choose whichever sources 
or news agencies they prefer, often cost alone is a decisive 
factor in tipping the scales toward MTI.
There are two known cases of MTI failing to report on 
events that reflected negatively on the government. The 
first instance was a reading by former President László 
Sólyom from his book criticizing the current government. 
The second was a press conference from Fidesz’s parlia-
mentary majority leader Antal Rogán in which he was 
forced to answer pointed questions about his income tax 
statements. One further case is known in which a televi-
sion editor manipulated footage of an antigovernment 
protest; the editor was fired after the manipulation was 
revealed.
There are at the same time many examples in the 
Hungarian media landscape today of engaged journalists 
who are critical of the government, especially on various 
independent Internet outlets. 
The most recent example comes from the website 
Origo, one of the largest Hungarian news sources. One 
journalist reported on the exorbitantly high hotel costs 
of János Lázár, head the prime minister’s office. Was the 
subsequent dismissal of Origo’s editor-in-chief a direct 
result of this story? A large number of the outlet’s politi-
cal editorial staff quit in response to the firing, and Lázár 
was accused of applying political pressure in the case. 
However, both Origo and its owner, Magyar Telekom (a 
subsidiary of Germany’s Deutsche Telekom), explained 
that restructuring plans and not political pressure were 
the reason for the editor’s removal. The reorientation of 
the website seems to support this statement; Origo has 
had four editors-in-chief in the past three years. Further, 
there are known plans to sell the site to another media 
company, Sanoma. 
The Lázár case is not entirely clear; it is, however, 
striking that complaints of threats to the freedom of 
the press in the domestic and international press were 
raised before clarity in the matter had been achieved. It is 
perhaps better to continue to seek the answer and wait for 
that result before preemptively deciding that Origo’s own-
ers’ motivations were influenced by the administration.
Development of a conservative media empire
The last ten years have seen consistent growth in conser-
vative media outlets. One reason for this is most certainly 
a result of Fidesz’s experience prior to and while govern-
ing from 1998–2002. In comparison with the left-liberal 
coalition, which had inherited and maintained a strong 
media position from the socialist period, the conservative 
side at that time had an objective need to catch up. Fidesz 
spent the last decade – longer, that is, than the period 
of Orbán’s leadership – forging close bonds with private 
media partners. In addition, the party made an effort 
after 2010 to effect more government-friendly positions in 
public media through changes in personnel policy. (This 
was in large part in response to the similar practice of 
earlier leftist governments.) This was made possible by 
not only by staff cutbacks – changes that were, according 
to our experts, absolutely necessary – but also by concrete 
personnel changes exclusively to Fidesz’s benefit, which 
must be viewed critically.
In summary, there is no proof in Hungary either of 
direct censorship or of a direct governmental influence on 
the content of media coverage. Even the new media law 
kept the structures of the 1995 media law largely intact. 
As in many other countries today, the most significant 
media problems are tied to more complex ownership 
structures and precarious employment policies, charac-
terized by financial shortfalls and occasional lapses in 
professionalism. In this way, Hungary also suffers from 
an unconscious conformity in reporting, with journalists 
attempting to fit their stories to their employer’s expecta-
tions. These tendencies are naturally advantageous to a 
government as strong as Orbán’s.
At the same time, the administration is trying to make 
both public media outlets and the media regulatory 
and control agencies more government-friendly, largely 
through changes in personnel policy. These attempts 
–while they are technically legal both in their reach and 
given Fidesz’s two-thirds parliamentary majority – should 
nevertheless be viewed with concern, especially from the 
personnel angle, and this despite the existing and contin-
ued variety as well as volume of oppositional media out-
lets. It would be better if party and government attempts 
to influence personnel policy were far more transparent 
as well as more clearly directed at achieving institutional 
balance. In this regard there is no shortage of adequate 
European role models.
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Social Justice and Corruption
An example from media coverage:
Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán is presenting himself 
as a lawyer to the poor in the run-up to the parliamentary 
elections in April [2014]. Yet his politics are instead profit-
able to Hungary’s rich and to Orbán’s closest friends….
As thousands cheer, Orbán descends the stairs of the Na-
tional Museum toward his podium. He will not permit the 
population to be “permanently excluded,” Orbán thunders. 
His government protects families from “profiteers, monopo-
lies, cartels, and imperial bureaucrats.”…
At the same time, social divisions in the country run 
deeper than they have since the end of the communist dicta-
torship in 1989–90. Since last year, the governing majority 
has repeatedly decreased utility costs such as electricity, 
gas, and water – an election-year gift, sold under the slogan, 
“Fighting foreign companies.” Nevertheless, around three 
million people – nearly one-third of the population – are 
poor and living in precarious circumstances.
It is the upper 10 percent who profit from Orbán’s eco-
nomic and social policies. This is the core of Fidesz’s clientele. 
Further, Orbán himself and a few dozen of his nearest and 
dearest have managed to reach high levels of wealth surpris-
ingly quickly – often under questionable circumstances….
A handful of extraordinarily wealthy businesspeople con-
trol a large percentage of the Hungarian economy through 
their corporate empires; they are handed the bulk of state 
contracts and projects and collect a large portion of Hun-
gary’s EU development funds….
Journalists from atlatszo.hu, a website founded in 2011, 
have meticulously researched the transactions of these and 
other oligarchs, as well as their interdependencies with 
Fidesz. “Corruption and crooked dealings by oligarchs were 
also an issue under the earlier socialist-liberal coalition,” 
said investigative journalist Attila Mong, “but under Orbán, 
the state has become hostage to private and party  interests.”25 
Critical reflection 
The accusation of social inequality does not stand up to 
scrutiny, if inequality is measured using Gini coefficients 
in a comparison of data from 1992 (with a Gini coefficient 
of 27.9) through 2013 (28.0).26 At first glance, the article 
cited could be correct if one considers that the values 
from 1992 and 2013 are nearly identical. An examination 
of the entire transformation period, however, contra-
dicts the report’s interpretation. It is not true that “social 
divisions in the country run deeper than they have since 
the end of the communist dictatorship in 1989–90.” The 
development of the Gini coefficients shows that social 
inequality in Hungary was at its worst in 2006 (33.3) and 
then improved through 2010 (24.1), before beginning to 
worsen again during the international financial crisis. 
The final Hungarian value – 26.9 in 2012 – is comparable 
to the rest of Europe and actually much better than the 
European average of 30.6, though in 2013 it climbed again 
(to 28.0).27 Across Europe, the years 2010–13 were marked 
by the greatest social inequality, in Latvia (35.7) among 
other countries such as Spain, Portugal, and the UK (all 
between 32 and 35 points); in comparison, Norway had 
the least social inequality (22.6). While it is true that so-
cial inequality has been growing in Hungary since 2010, it 
is not doing so at a more dramatic rate than the European 
average. This is rather part of a worldwide trend.
The newspaper article’s second accusation – that “it is 
the upper ten percent, however, who profit from Orbán’s 
economic and social policies” – is seen by critics as a 
consequence of the government’s new, flat, 16-percent 
tax rate. Administration representatives, however, stress 
that this tax rate has above all decreased the level of tax 
evasion, created more new and legal jobs, in addition to 
raising the level of both private consumption and corpo-
rate investment.
Even if these claims are contestable, the employment 
rate (according to Eurostat) since the introduction of the 
flat tax has risen from 55.4 percent (2010)28 to 61.8 percent 
(August 2014). Unemployment, which had fluctuated 
between 10 and 12 percent from 2010 and 2013, fell to 7.9 
percent (August 2014)29 – a low that had not been reached 
in the past six years.30 Critics argue that these numbers 
are due in large part to the controversial public works 
programs, but Eurostat statistics show that the number of 
private employees also rose slightly in 2014.
It is true that the flat tax rate benefits the top 20 per-
cent of the population. In order to partially balance out 
these disadvantages, the parliament enacted job protec-
tion measures and means of compensation. The net share 
of tax payments nevertheless remained the same as in 
most democracies: the top 20 percent pay around 60 per-
cent of the total income tax.
For the most part, such tax policy is widely used across 
numerous countries in Central and Eastern Europe, in 
response to a society that during its transformation pro-
cess was characterized both by relatively low employment 
and, simultaneously, by massive tax evasion. Hungary 
oriented itself toward a Slovakian model, where a flat tax 
rate was introduced in 2004 (before being differentiated 
in 2013); this flat tax rate could also be seen as a temporary 
measure in Hungary. In Europe, the following countries 
also have flat tax rates: Bulgaria (10 percent); the Czech 
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 Republic (15 percent); Estonia (21 percent); Latvia (23 
percent); Lithuania (15 percent); and Romania (16 percent).
The article names cronyism as a further reason for 
social inequality: “A handful of extraordinarily wealthy 
businesspeople control a large percentage of the Hungar-
ian economy through their corporate empires; they are 
handed the bulk of state contracts and projects and collect 
a large portion of Hungary’s EU development funds.” Ac-
cording to Transparency International, Hungary is 47th on 
the list of corrupt countries, behind Poland (in 38th place) 
but ahead of the Czech Republic (place 57) and Slovakia 
(place 61).31 The new constitution even includes transpar-
ency rules for public spending were even included, and 
as a result, the EU’s anticorruption report praised the ad-
ministration’s anticorruption measures while complaining 
about their application in practice. Others, however, ex-
pressed their concerns about corruption in sharper terms. 
The October 2014 case of US travel restrictions imposed 
on high-level Hungarian civil servants on accusations of 
corruption requires further investigation.32 This is compli-
cated by the fact that the US will reveal neither the names 
of the individuals in question nor any known evidence. 
The US carries primary responsibility for this charge.
To sum up, we have shown here that social inequality 
in Hungary is at the level of the European average, neither 
rising to nor surpassing the levels reached in the immedi-
ate post-communist era. It is correct to say that the govern-
ment’s economic policies do benefit the top ten percent of 
the population – but this development and criticism are 
not limited to Hungary. At the same time, the country has 
also benefited, as the recent employment numbers have 
shown. This trend is further strengthened by GDP growth 
of 3.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014, a rise far 
greater than analysts had predicted. Even if this trend is 
not yet entirely reliable, one can nevertheless recognize its 
positive development. 
Anti-Semitism
An example from media coverage:
Since rightist-conservative Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
took office in 2010, the climate for minorities has become 
worse, according to observers.…33
Orbán did not scrimp on denunciations of anti-Semitism 
[at the World Jewish Congress in 2013] per se – but his an-
swer to [Ronald] Lauder was not very concrete either. It was 
far more his attempt to downplay the extent of the problem 
in Hungary by pointing instead to the rest of Europe. Must 
not all of Europe ask itself, he asked the group, how it could 
come to such an economic crisis, sowing seeds of frustration, 
anger, and hate now blooming in certain areas? Further, 
according to Orbán, “The new constitution we wrote two 
years ago grants all Jews and other minorities living among 
us true protection, security, human and collective dignity.” 
The new Hungarian constitution is, however, contentious. 
Orbán passed it with his party Fidesz’s two-thirds par-
liamentary majority. It was incapable of preventing the 
increase in anti-Semitic incidents in Hungary….
The Hungarian government is on a dangerous course. It 
is allowing racist and neo-Nazi escapades. Viktor Orbán 
should have addressed this more seriously in his speech 
before the World Jewish Congress. The prime minister,  
however, failed in this assignment.… Orbán needs to take  
a stand. But he refuses to do so.34
Critical reflection 
It must be acknowledged that Hungary does have a tradi-
tionally strong anti-Semitic movement. It is statistically 
about as strong as in France.35 Two recent investigations 
into Hungarian anti-Semitism found that anti-Semitism 
was at its highest between 2006 and 2010 (that is, before 
the Orbán government) and has declined somewhat since 
2010.36 The fact that perceptions do not reflect this decline 
relates to the entry of the far-right Jobbik party into parli-
amentary politics. Despite the fact that anti-Semitism has 
experienced a mild decline in the country, Jobbik’s very 
visible presence in the Hungarian parliament means that 
it is more palpable today than in the past. This results in 
a significantly higher perception of anti-Semitism among 
the general public.
In this sense, one may agree with the article’s state-
ment that “since rightist-conservative Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán took office in 2010, the climate for minorities 
has become worse,” despite the fact that anti-Semitism 
has not risen statistically in this time period or that 
 investigations uncovered no “increase in anti-Semitic 
incidents in Hungary” since 2010.
Open anti-Semitic polemics would have been un-
imaginable in Hungary even a few years ago. With the 
Jobbik party’s arrival in parliament, however, Jobbik now 
articulates its hatred there and in other areas as well. The 
public, political presence of anti-Semitism has indeed 
come about during the period since Orbán assumed office, 
but is not a result of the Fidesz government. The fact that 
Jobbik was the third-strongest party in the 2010 elec-
tions was more plausibly the result of the collapse of the 
socialist-liberal Gyurcsány adminstration.
Unlike in most Western European countries, anti-
Semitic leanings in Hungary do not for the most part 
correlate with political party preferences of the voters 
themselves; the percentage of voters with anti-Semitic 
16 Hungary in the Media, 2010–2014
DGAPreport  / No. 29 / June 2015
prejudices in most parties – with the exceptions of Jobbik 
at 49 percent and the LMP at 12 percent – simply reflects 
the Hungarian average of 33 percent: anti-Semitism 
among conservative Fidesz voters is at 39 percent; within 
the socialist opposition MSZP, it is 38 percent; within 
Együtt, a party of social democrats, it is 30 percent; while 
in the DK (the Democratic Coalition) it is 30 percent.37 
Examining the charge that the new constitution “was 
incapable of preventing the increase in anti-Semitic 
incidents in Hungary,” the experts we consulted noted 
the difficulty in prosecuting hate speech against groups 
over the past twenty years, which has been a matter of 
individual case law. A legal ban on hate speech existed 
but was impossible to enforce. For one thing, this was 
due to the earlier Constitutional Court’s extremely liberal 
interpretation of freedom of opinion (following an Ameri-
can interpretation of freedom of opinion); for another, no 
single person was directly affected by the hate speech, 
which according to the laws at the time, was a require-
ment for prosecution.
In 2011, the Orbán administration added verbatim the 
EU directive 2008/913/IB on incitement against collective 
groups to the Hungarian civil code and underpinned it 
with the following amendment to the constitution (Ar-
ticle 9, Paragraphs 4 and 5): 
(4) The right to freedom of speech may not be exercised 
with the aim of violating the human dignity of others. 
(5) The right to freedom of speech may not be exercised 
with the aim of violating the dignity of the Hungarian 
nation or of any national, ethnic, racial, or religious com-
munity. Persons belonging to such communities shall be en-
titled to enforce their claims in court against the expression 
of an opinion which violates the community, invoking the 
violation of their human dignity, as provided for by an Act.
This constitutional amendment was greeted as an “his-
torical step,” especially by the country’s Jewish communi-
ties and was concretely applied in a case for the first time 
shortly following ratification.38 
At the same time, it seems dangerous that the freedom 
of expression of opinion could be limited by “violation 
of the dignity of the Hungarian nation.” This addition to 
the constitution offers a potential legal basis for grave 
restrictions on the freedom of opinion, as “the dignity 
of the Hungarian nation” could be interpreted in widely 
differing ways, despite the fact that “protection of the 
dignity of the nation” has been noted by and defined in 
the Hungarian criminal law code since 1993, where it has 
been applied solely to national symbols such as the flag, 
the national anthem, and the Hungarian coat of arms.
The cited article claims further that the government is 
“on a dangerous course, [because] it is allowing racist and 
neo-Nazi escapades.” It concludes that “Orbán needs to 
take a stand. But he refuses to do so.” Fidesz, they claim, 
regularly uses double entendres and nationalistic rhetoric 
in order to win over Jobbik voters. Without a distinguish-
ing itself clearly from Jobbik, the party does not take a 
clear stance against anti-Semitism. These accusations 
against the government are ill-founded, however; in fact, 
numerous measures and official statements by adminis-
tration representatives contradict them. These measures 
have repeatedly explained the party’s zero-tolerance 
for anti-Semitic statements.39 Our experts unanimously 
agreed that no previous government had done so much 
to counter anti-Semitism and to recognize Hungarian 
responsibility for the events of the Holocaust as the first 
Fidesz administration (1998–2002) and the current one. 
Both administrations introduced legislation, including 
the intensification of parliamentary rules of procedure 
against hate speech and specified monitoring of anti-Se-
mitic incidents to be performed on a monthly basis by the 
Brussels Institute of the Action and Protection Foundation 
according to OSCE methodology.40
On both moral and symbolic levels, the Orbán adminis-
tration has “taken a stand,” precisely as the above-quoted 
article demands. It was the first administration since 1945 
to ask for forgiveness for Hungary’s role in the Holo-
caust.41 Further, the government has undertaken impor-
tant initiatives across the cultural memorial landscape. 
The first Orbán administration built the first Holocaust 
memorial center in Central Europe and created an an-
nual Hungarian Holocaust Remembrance Day tied to an 
educational program for schoolchildren. The government 
named 2014 Holocaust Memorial Year, and numerous 
synagogues were renovated and Jewish cultural life 
 received additional support under its framework. The 
prime minister repeatedly and unmistakably distanced 
himself from Jobbik, both in his election campaign as 
well as in an interview with Israeli newspaper Yedioth 
Ahronoth after the Budapest World Jewish Congress.42
New controversies, however, continue to throw a 
wrench into the government’s policies: the discussion 
over the memorial to the occupation; the inclusion of 
racist authors in school curricula; state awards to right-
radical journalists and artists. While the latter contro-
versy appears to have been due to inadvertent ignorance, 
it is evidence of a continued lack of sensitivity on the topic 
of anti-Semitism and has thus raised doubts about the 
believability of the other measures listed.
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Even the administration’s behavior regarding the 
memorial to the Nazi occupation – known as the Occupa-
tion Memorial – could be seen as a step backward insofar 
as the model of the memorial opens the possibility of 
interpreting Hungary as only partially responsible for its 
role in the Holocaust. The administration stresses that 
this memorial is in no part a reference to the Holocaust, 
but rather a memorial to the victims of German occupa-
tion.43 This sparked criticism worldwide, showing that 
the government had failed to present its policy in a clear 
and sensitive manner. Even across Hungary and among 
representatives of the Jewish community, the memorial 
met with criticism. The Jewish umbrella organization 
Mazsihisz recused itself from all official events within 
the framework of the 2014 Holocaust Remembrance Year, 
partly in protest over the Occupation Memorial.
The anti-Semitism debate about and within Hungary 
has a clearly dangerous party dimension. In our Work-
ing Group’s consultations with experts, the view was 
expressed from the Jewish community that accusations 
of anti-Semitism between parties were themselves part of 
the problem. 
Such insults are often all too easily cast for political 
reasons, for example to discredit the Fidesz administra-
tion internationally. In this respect, and most unfortu-
nately, a gravely important theme – anti-Semitism – has 
been instrumentalized for political purposes. For exactly 
this reason the debate surrounding the Occupation 
Memorial in early 2014 became one of the opposition’s 
election-year talking points. 
The media occasionally accuses Fidesz of latent coop-
eration with Jobbik and even intending to form a future 
coalition with that party. Reporting on the new media tax, 
a German daily newspaper wrote that Fidesz, “together 
with the oppositional, right extremist party Jobbik,” 
agreed on this tax.44 Yet Fidesz had a large enough major-
ity to pass the law on its own without needing to make 
a deal with Jobbik. (There is no way to prevent another 
party from also voting for one’s legislation in parliament.) 
The administration has always been very critical of Job-
bik, and Fidesz is the only party that can keep Jobbik 
politically in check – as evidenced by the 2014 EU election 
results. In introducing legislation and in investigatory 
and parliamentary committees, even the socialist MSZP 
practiced a so-called “technical” cooperation with Jobbik, 
despite that party’s public avowal of a strict delineation.
Hungary finds itself at a key juncture in its histori-
cal process of political and economic transformation. 
Many of the experts we consulted considered the current 
reporting on the situation of Hungarian Jews, especially 
within the German-language press, to be one-sided and 
rather counterproductive. It unnecessarily supports the 
expression of “freedom trauma” of many Hungarians 
against imagined “international interference” and in 
this way mobilizes even extreme groups for whom such 
reporting is in fact most opportune. 
Moderate political forces in the administration and 
the opposition are not helped by one-sided reporting – 
especially on the topic of anti-Semitism – underlining 
their existing differences by exacerbating them. In the 
end, the Jewish community also suffers from this, as their 
representatives reported, because they feel they are being 
instrumentalized in cross-party conflicts.
Experts also noted the renaissance in Jewish life that 
has been underway in Hungary for years, especially 
among young people. The country is experiencing active 
exchange with Israel, as a kind of “homeland tourism” 
takes place between the two countries.45 In connection 
to this, the former chair of the Hungarian Jewish Com-
munity organization, Péter Feldmájer, stated that “‘95 per-
cent of the time, one can lead a normal and happy, good 
Jewish life in Hungary.… There are 40 synagogues; there 
are Jewish schools, clinics, social welfare organizations, 
and youth clubs.’ This is important to him [Feldmájer], 
because journalists usually only ask about the remain-
ing ‘five percent [of the time],’ which is indeed ‘highly 
 problematic.’”46
Homelessness
An example from media coverage:
On Monday [September 30, 2013], the Hungarian parlia-
ment passed a controversial law forbidding the homeless 
from sleeping on public streets or squares. Homeless people 
found in noncompliance may even be punished with impris-
onment….
Soon the homeless will no longer be welcomed at any of 
Hungary’s [UNESCO] World Heritage sites. Beyond this, 
local governments are allowed to create homeless-free zones 
at their own discretion. Violations can be punished with 
community service or monetary fines. “Repeat offenders” 
may face prison time. 
The socialist opposition party MSZP laments that, as 
a result of this “inhumane” law, the homeless could be 
“hunted” by the authorities without having committed any 
crime. The new law, they say, has only been created to pre-
vent the presence of these people from blemishing the admin-
istration’s “success propaganda.” Hundreds of Hungarians 
protested the law in front of parliament.47
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Critical reflection 
The starting point for this law was pressure from 
many mayors – even those from the opposition party 
MSZP – to deal with the increasingly difficult situation of 
homelessness in public areas, as the number of homeless 
people has grown dramatically in the past five to six years, 
largely for economic reasons.
Between 2006 and 2010 – before the Orbán govern-
ment – 131 homeless men and women froze to death in 
Budapest. In many parts of town there were homeless 
camps, creating unsustainable circumstances for both the 
homeless and residents nearby. Because the Constitution-
al Court struck down the first attempt – a 2011 law – as 
unconstitutional, in 2013 the administration introduced 
a measure into the constitution in order to establish a 
common, nationwide legal basis for this local responsibil-
ity. The Constitution’s new Article 22, Paragraph 3 applies 
only in cases where residence in public space becomes 
permanent. That means that only “habitual dwelling” is 
forbidden in World Heritage sites and other public areas 
designated as such by local authorities. The regulation is 
intended “to protect public order, public security, public 
health, and cultural values.” Violations are administrative 
offenses. Three repeat offenses can result in a fine, com-
munity service, or even incarceration.
Thus far, only a few cases of fines are known, and 
incarceration has yet to occur. Those affected and their 
social workers verify that the police have behaved in 
a rather reserved way since the law’s passage. Beyond 
World Heritage sites incorporating large sections of 
central Budapest along the Danube, Budapest’s no-go 
zones include its metro stations, areas surrounding play-
grounds, cemeteries, and schools, as well as bridges and 
underpasses. In that the misdemeanor in question applies 
only to habitation, the law is similar to Vienna’s recent 
 “camping ban.”
Parallel to this law, local governments were required 
to guarantee the provision of shelters for the homeless. 
Orbán’s administration started a program in 2012 to 
expand housing and guarantee free medical care as well 
as hospital visits for the homeless, granting it €30 million. 
The number of homeless people in Hungary cannot be 
exactly measured, but is presently estimated at 30,000–
50,000. That said, there are nearly two decades’ worth 
of survey data on homeless people who have used social 
services and shelters during this period. The number of 
spaces in homeless shelters rose from 8,200 to 11,000 
between 2011 and 2013. According to one study, the capac-
ity of most shelters reaches only 80–90 percent, even in 
winter months.48 One administration statement clarified 
that one of the goals of the new regulation was to encour-
age the homeless to take advantage of available amenities 
and services. Given the high number of homeless people, 
many experts agree that further expansion of facilities 
will be necessary.
The criticism that the Hungarian administration 
intends to “hunt” or criminalize the homeless is not ad-
equately grounded. It is not forbidden for homeless people 
to be in certain areas. Rather, the law was intended to 
address specific areas that had become camps for a large 
number of individuals, leading to extremely unhygienic 
conditions. 
The regulation was intended to secure public order 
and hygiene and to encourage the homeless to take 
advantage of the housing and services available to them. 
International criticism assumed the mantle of the (politi-
cally motivated) Hungarian opposition, while there was 
inadequate reporting on conditions that had previously 
prevailed and little coverage of government measures to 
support the homeless.
State of the Roma Minority
An example from media coverage:
Critics have long claimed that right-nationalist Fidesz 
encourages the country’s rampant anti-Roma racism….
The verdict following the series of murders of Hungarian 
Roma illustrates that the justice system is cracking down 
on racially motivated crimes. Nevertheless, a dangerous 
mood of rightist extremism and xenophobia is growing. Its 
most important protagonist is the chair of the Jobbik party, 
Gábor Vona. But even Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is part 
of its rise….
Even the constitutional changes that Orbán and his 
coalition pushed through parliament allow recognition of a 
creeping nationalization and power concentration in Hun-
gary. Discrimination against minorities is most obvious in 
the areas of culture and education.49
Critical reflection
This remark represents a style of criticism that overlooks 
the fact that Fidesz was the first and only party in all 
of Europe with a Roma representative in the European 
Parliament (immediately following Hungary’s EU acces-
sion in 2004). Its charges are contradicted by the fact that 
one of Hungary’s most significant projects during its 2011 
Council of the EU presidency was the EU-wide implemen-
tation of a comprehensive European Roma strategy. This 
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strategy drew Europe’s attention to the situation affecting 
10–12 million European Roma and formulated four goals: 
First, improvement to school access was stressed as a 
necessity for entrance into the labor market; second, access 
to the labor market itself should be eased, as the percent-
age of unemployed among the Roma is alarmingly high (in 
Hungary, estimated at 65–75 percent). The third goal is 
access to medical care. Even in Hungary, the Roma have a 
lower life expectancy than the rest of the population, and 
certain illnesses affect them more often due to their inferior 
living conditions. The fourth goal is intended to improve 
their access to housing and social services. Near the end of 
the Hungarian Council presidency, an EU Roma strategy 
until 2020 was passed which will complement Europe 2020 
goals in this field.50
The Hungarian government has made solid efforts 
toward improving the situation of the Roma population. 
Why does such a large discrepancy between this reality 
and public perception still exist? Perhaps it is because the 
results of many of these changes will not be visible for 
decades. The number of Roma completing school contin-
ues to grow. In Hungary, as in Romania, there has been 
a strong upswing in Roma elites, and the development of 
Roma intellectuals has been a high priority for Minister 
Zoltán Balog, who feels they will best represent the inter-
ests of this group independently. Aspiring Roma elites in 
Hungary have come to realize that Roma must be more 
aware of their rights. They are far more conscious of this 
today and have become much more vocal with regards 
to general human rights, women’s rights, and the right to 
social and economic development.
Conclusions
In numerous meetings with both Hungarian and German 
external experts, the Working Group conducted intense 
discussions on the developments in Hungary and their 
coverage in German-language and international me-
dia. This process brought to light differing opinions and 
assessments.
On the basis of our interviews with experts, the Work-
ing Group is nevertheless of the overall opinion that Hun-
gary today is a free and democratic state that respects the 
rule of law, where the press is not subject to censorship, 
and where the current administration does not support 
anti-Semitism; in fact, the state has taken significant 
steps to fight anti-Semitism. Judicial independence exists 
in the country as well. 
That said, Orbán’s strongly party-influenced position 
has led to party-influenced personnel decisions that are 
neither good for the individual institutions nor ultimately 
beneficial as a whole, in that it could restrict the diversity 
that ever democracy needs.
The Working Group’s numerous discussions clearly 
showed that, while some of the points made in the media 
today against Orbán’s administration are accurate, many 
accusations are greatly exaggerated or even factually 
incorrect.
No country and no government is perfect. Neverthe-
less, no dialogue involving the peoples of Europe can be 
fruitful if it is based on prejudice and bias. Criticism is 
necessary, but it must be grounded in cogent argument 
and backed by evidence. This is equally applicable to all 
EU states. Criticism should not be made as a condemna-
tion but should rather be used constructively to make a 
step forward in the developmental process of European 
democracy. 
Recommendations
In both our examination of media reporting as well as 
in our discussions with German and Hungarian experts, 
it became clear that the reporting of numerous media 
sources is simply incomplete and one-sided, and at its 
worst deeply flawed. Such reporting leads readers to 
draw skewed conclusions about the situation in Hungary. 
Unfortunately, this negatively influences how the country 
is seen across the spectrum of German politics. Due to 
a combination of misunderstandings, mistakes, omis-
sions, and political prejudice in reporting, it is no longer 
possible to judge to what degree the developments in 
Hungary in fact contradict European democratic values 
on the one hand, or on the other hand are at all different 
from what occurs in Germany, for example – but never-
theless are neither antidemocratic nor anti-European and 
therefore should be accepted, if only on the grounds of 
national sovereignty.
The quality of reporting could be improved if:
 . the information reported were closely checked and 
critically examined through conversations with either 
politically independent experts or experts with differ-
ing political views;
 . research consultation expanded beyond the small circle 
of famous German-speaking Hungarians or Hungarian 
exiles in Germany to include other recognized scholars 
and experts;
 . specific events or developments were reported in con-
text, with ample background explanation, and only on 
the basis of verifiable information.
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While traditionally positive, German-Hungarian relations 
have suffered greatly in recent years and desperately re-
quire new and inspiring catalysts. To this end, both sides 
will have to leave behind their at times politically-based 
thought patterns and approach one another without 
prejudice – without ungrounded accusations, but also 
without exaggerated sensitivity on the Hungarian side.
Orbán’s administration clearly ascribes great impor-
tance to both stability in the democratic political system 
as well as efficiency of governmental action. In this sense, 
Orbán views his parliamentary majority as a democratic 
authorization to make sweeping reforms. His Băile 
Tuşnad speech unleashed heavy international criticism, 
despite the fact that its subjects – upon more careful study 
– offered little opportunity for such; Orbán here sought a 
path to guide his country from today’s ruthless economic 
liberalism to a stronger state following ideals beyond 
profit maximization, all within the framework of liberal 
democracy and respect for human rights. On this path, he 
envisions greater protections for the socially disadvan-
taged and for Hungary’s national interests – and in this 
way hopes to ensure from his perspective that Hungary 
will stay competitive.
Orbán’s remarks, however, could have met with less 
rejection had he chosen his concepts more carefully. For 
his remarks indeed posed many questions worthy of 
discussion. Perhaps he intended to be provocative; yet his 
use of the phrase “illiberal state” is easily and quite un-
derstandably misinterpreted and rejected across Europe, 
even if he only intended to apply it, as it appears from his 
remarks, to the “illiberal” economic order. Orbán thereby 
complicated objective discussion from the outset, if he 
did not discredit his concerns completely. Whoever seeks 
to be heard in the European discourse must be careful to 
choose language that will not be easily falsely interpreted.
Orbán’s tense relationship with the European Com-
mission should not be the basis for mutual accusations. 
Rather, it rather should be used to start a well-grounded 
debate on the future of the EU’s democratic system in 
the world today. Germany and Hungary could bring all 
of Europe closer together with a productive dialogue on 
questions of stable democratic structures in the global 
context.
Based on the Working Group’s experiences and results, 
the DGAP would like to create a space for a dialogue 
between Germany and Hungary on the future of Europe. 
It has therefore formed a standing German-Hungarian 
Discussion Circle, which held its first meeting on January 
28, 2015 to address the topic of Hungary’s energy foreign 
policy; at its second meeting on March 25, the group 
discussed the Hungarian opposition. These discussions 
aim to help return German-Hungarian relations to what 
they were 25 years ago: a motor for European democratic 
development.
This report does not pretend to be exhaustive. To this 
end, we are grateful for additions and constructive criti-
cism that would help us round out the picture presented 
in this report.
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